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development project. Congressional authorization and
appropriation required supporting documentation that
the CAP was necessary for the economic viability of
central Arizona agriculture. All parties recognized that
in 30-50 years the CAP would evolve into a largely
urban and Native American project due to increasing
urbanization in central Arizona and successful
adjudication of Indian water rights. However, the initial
economic justification was based on the agricultural
economy.

INTRODUCTION
Mobilizing economic science for water resource
management decisions has a checkered past in the
western United States. In many instances, economic
analysis of varying degrees of rigor has been applied to
water resource planning efforts as either an ex post
validation or critique of a political decision. All too
rarely do economists play a timely ex ante role
equivalent to the roles played by politicians, engineers,
hydrologists, and lawyers in water resource
management
planning
and
decision-making.
Responsibility for being a non-player partially rests with
economists themselves, as we are drawn away from
difficult Western water issues towards safer disciplinebased research. However, major responsibility rests
with public policy makers and private water users who
often view economic science as a threat to their political
ideas, particularly their desire to appease special
political interests by extracting economic rents from
rate- and taxpayers.

The key economic issue surrounding the CAP, at least
for agriculture, is captured in Figure 1. First, total
project cost would approach $5 billion and the aqueduct
would be 335 miles long. Not only did a little less than
half of this cost need to be repaid by water users, but
also the distribution systems for irrigation districts had
to be repaid by growers as well. Some of these systems
cost grower-managed districts $100 million. Secondly,
water had to be lifted over 2,000 feet from the Colorado
River to Tucson. Combined with other operations,
maintenance and repair (OM&R) costs, early
projections for water costs were two to three times the
current cost of pumping groundwater. The fundamental
question surrounding the early discussion of the CAP
was, “Can farmers afford this water?”

The early history of the Central Arizona Project (CAP)
is well documented by Johnson (1977), starting with the
formation of the League of the Southwest in 1919 to
project authorization by Congress in 1968. Along the
way Arizona filed an interstate legal suit against
California to adjudicate its rights to the use of Colorado
River water. This suit ended in 1963 when the U.S.
Supreme Court decreed that Arizona had a right to 2.8
million acre-feet of Colorado River water (Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546). The consistent authorization
of federal funding for the CAP proved equally
contentious for 25 years. One quid pro quo for
continued CAP funding required by the Carter
Administration was the hurried design, passage and
implementation of the 1980 Groundwater Management
Act by the State of Arizona. Construction on the
Havasu Pumping Plant began in 1973 and households in
Tucson, at the end of the 335-mile aqueduct, began
drinking CAP water in November 1992.

Early economic analyses, one prior to the signing of the
Colorado River Basin Act in 1968, challenged the
economic rationale for the CAP (Young and Martin,
1967; Kelso et al., 1973). CAP water, if priced at cost
of delivery, would drive growers out of business if they
were forced to substitute CAP water for groundwater.
Kelso et al. (1973) argued that Arizona had sufficient
water for economic growth; the real problem according
to these analysts was the misallocation of existing water
supplies. Barr and Pingry (1977a,b) released detailed
reports analyzing the complex cost structure of the
CAP, warning policy makers that municipal water users
and taxpayers would pay the majority of the CAP costs.
These early analyses created a firestorm of criticism
against the scientific findings. Careers were threatened
and financial support for research was withdrawn for a
time. Bush and Martin (1986) concluded that most

The major controversy surrounding the CAP centered
on its economic feasibility as an agricultural
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Figure 1. Elevation Changes in the CAP Main Canal

irrigation districts would be worse off with the CAP
than without it. Not all grower-controlled irrigation
districts heeded these warnings.

The remainder of this paper is a brief, personal
evaluation of the continuing lessons learned as
economic science attempts to inform water resource
policy decisions. The CAP is the case study. A more
thorough analysis of the agricultural component of the
CAP can be found in Wilson (1997).

Nine of 23 potential irrigation districts or agricultural
operations contracted for CAP water and built
distribution systems.
By the early 1990s the
underutilization of CAP water by farmers became a
serious public policy issue in the state (Wilson, 1992).
Two irrigation districts declared bankruptcy, the first
time in U.S. history that a federally supported irrigation
district has failed economically (Baker, 1995).
Irrigation districts surrendered their long-term CAP
contracts for assurance of subsidized CAP water for at
least 10 years. The CAP became a municipal and
industrial (M&I) and Native American project 40 years
earlier than anticipated by project planners. And finally,
the State of Arizona initiated a massive effort to bank
CAP water in the ground to increase the state’s
utilization of its Colorado River allocation. The
implications of faulty CAP economics have cost
taxpayers millions of dollars in attorney and consultant
fees, countless hours of public officials’ time, and lower
returns on municipal bonds. However, the CAP
aqueduct continues to be professionally managed and
operated by the Central Arizona Water Conservation
District.

ECONOMIC SCIENCE LESSONS
Economics, the science of decision-making under
scarcity, presents the decision maker with a rich array of
analytical models for understanding resource allocation
issues.
These conceptual frameworks produce
important insights concerning the direction and
magnitude of change in key variables when existing
policies are modified or new policies are implemented.
Economics also has a rich tradition of empirically
validating economic theory through case study analysis,
econometric data analysis, financial budgeting,
laboratory experiments, mathematical programming and
simulations. Significant efficiencies are gained for
society by “getting the economics right” in the public
policy process. These cost savings can be comparable
to or exceed efficiencies realized from engineering,
financing or legal expertise.
Key federal and state policy makers began to understand
how “wrong” their economic understanding was as they
participated in an interdisciplinary, interagency study in
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forward with the decision if the marginal benefits
exceed the marginal costs. In irrigation decisionmaking the grower compares the cost of the last acrefoot of water with the anticipated revenue produced by
that last acre-foot of water. Average values of benefits
and costs are higher over the relevant decision space
because high and low values over the entire range of
production levels are averaged. Averages can be useful
to establish overall profitability in an accounting sense
but serve very little purpose in accurately determining
the economic impact of an adjustment in the business.
The ability to pay concept is economically flawed as a
project evaluation criterion.

the state’s largest CAP irrigation district in the early
1990s and with the subsequent publication of the team’s
detailed analysis (Dedrick et al., 1992). Within months
it became clear that deals would have to be negotiated
between all participating parties to avoid a significant
financial burden on the state’s rate- and taxpayers.
These deals involved a combination of refinancing,
contract cancellations, subsidized water for agriculture,
electrical power generation swaps, increased property
taxes and a plethora of new CAP water using programs
(e.g. Water Bank, river rehabilitation projects).
Adjustments to the institutional environment
surrounding the CAP continue to this day. What should
we learn from this interaction of economic science and
water management?

BoR- and district-funded feasibility studies failed to use
willingness to pay methods and elevated ability to pay
for the CAP. First, it was assumed that all the acreage
in the CAP districts would be farmed every year for 50
years. Secondly, the studies assumed that relatively
large acreages of a high value crop would be farmed
every year, an assumption without historical precedence
then or now. And finally, these studies failed to
recognize that growers would use lower-cost
groundwater resources first. These errors in economic
judgment produced a false sense that farmers would buy
CAP water. The growers’ willingness to pay on the
margin actually was one-half to one-third the CAP price
in the early 1990s.

Lesson #1: Cheaper is Better
Mainstream economic theory has produced a rich and
powerful understanding of firm-level decisions using
the assumption that business managers maximize
profits. This scientific construct, while not a perfectly
accurate view of actual decision-making within the firm,
has generated a useful body of knowledge on the
comparative statics of economic behavior. Within this
profit-maximizing framework we know that businesses
will use their cheapest or less expensive inputs first
(assuming quality is equivalent) in the production of
goods and services. The lower-cost producer will
receive more net returns in the market relative to their
higher cost counterparts.

Lesson #3: You Can’t Predict the Future
The economics of decision-making under uncertainty
has been a core field in microeconomic theory for thirty
years. Economists recognize that the future cannot be
predicted with certainty. Therefore, economists and
financial analysts have developed a wide range of
models and analytical techniques to produce insights on
decisions and projects when uncertainty characterizes
key economic variables. Possibly the most elementary
technique is sensitivity analysis, changing a key variable
by 10 percent to evaluate the impact on a key
performance measure (e.g. profits, net present value,
internal rate of return, benefit-cost ratio).

Running throughout Bureau of Reclamation (BoR) and
engineering firm planning documents was the
assumption that groundwater would play a secondary
role in Arizona agriculture once CAP water could be
delivered to farms. For some hydrologic and economic
reasons (unknown at least to this author), CAP water
would soon be cheaper than groundwater. But the
reality was that “cheaper is better,” so farmers
continued to pump lower cost groundwater, leaving
CAP water in the Colorado River and causing a severe
underutilization problem for the state’s leaders. Some
planners and elected officials demonstrated complete
surprise when they finally understood how businesses
make decisions. But one elected city official in 1994
still insisted, “Farmers should buy CAP water because
that is the right thing to do.”

There is no record of any sensitivity analysis being
performed in the irrigation district feasibility studies.
Point estimates were used on prices, yields, water
prices, government programs, the acreage of high value
crops, etc.
A realistic 10 percent drop in gross
revenues in the farm models used in these studies would
have produced an “ability to pay” of approximately $20
per acre-foot—far below one estimate exceeding $100.

Lesson #2: Willingness to Pay is Less Than Ability to
Pay
A well-developed and empirically tested concept in
economics is that people make decisions “on the
margin.” We evaluate the incremental (i.e. marginal)
benefits and costs associated with decisions, going
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The CAP received Congressional funding based on the
need to develop and support central Arizona agriculture.
Planners did recognize that in 30-50 years the CAP
would be a largely urban and Native American project.
But not surprisingly, with the formal completion of the
project in 1993, the CAP immediately became a
municipal, industrial and Native American project.
These interests had and have today a higher willingness
to pay for water. This higher value in alternative uses
bids water away from lower-value uses. Unfortunately,
most of these exchanges are made through high cost
administrative decisions rather than a market tool
(Colby, 1993).

Lesson #4: Price Matters
One of the fundamental theoretical constructs of
economics is the principle of diminishing marginal
utility for buyers of goods and service. As we purchase
goods and services, eventually we receive less
satisfaction or fewer benefits from the last good or
service purchased.
Combined with price, this
empirically validated principle produces the downward
sloping demand curves so familiar in economics
textbooks and used in sophisticated models for public
policy analysis. Price must be lowered, ceteris paribus,
to increase sales. Higher prices reduce the quantity
sold.

OTHER LESSONS LEARNED
I vividly recall informally teaching this economic
principle in the early 1990s during a board meeting of
the Central Arizona Water Conservation District
(CAWCD), the autonomous administrative entity
responsible for the CAP. A majority of the board
wanted to survey CAP water users to discover their
intended water usage so the CAWCD could establish
the water price. This is backward economic logic and
doomed to failure. Eventually, the board agreed to
survey water users using a price schedule, asking them
how much water they would buy at different prices.
The CAWCD’s revised process developed a demand
curve, or willingness to pay curve, for water. With this
information the CAWCD established a more realistic
water price and correlated price assumptions to their
projected financial position. With many elected public
officials, and even technical personnel in some public
agencies, the economic lesson that buyers respond to
price requires constant instruction if a sound
understanding is to be reached.

Lessons 1-5 draw upon elementary economic principles
that have a long and distinguished history in economic
science. Economists become frustrated while working
in the public policy process when decision-makers
chose to ignore basic economic science. Water resource
management policy has a long history of ignoring
economic reality (Rucker and Fishback, 1983). The
study of public choices under constraints has developed
into two increasingly popular fields in economic
science: public choice theory and neo-institutional
economics. Both fields study how special interests use
the political process to obtain privileged treatment or
rents. Special emphasis is given in both fields to the
measurement of gains and losses for both the winners
and losers. The final three lessons learned from the
CAP reflect lessons learned in the political economy of
water resource management.
Lesson #6: Politics Trumps Economics, But Only
Temporarily

Lesson #5: I Can Outbid You
The “need” for the CAP was obvious to anyone visiting
central Arizona—it is a desert. By definition this area
had a shortage of water. Therefore, to protect it citizens
from drought and the lack of economic opportunity, the
CAP became the Holy Grail for every public official
and civic leader. Fear trumps economic science. With
the successful completion of the project the current
questions are who will pay for the available water and
how will it be allocated? Basic economic principles
remain so the pricing and allocation rules must be
changed to reflect the new economic reality of
underutilized CAP water.

The equal marginal value principle in economics
implies that a resource will be allocated to its highest
value use until either the quantity constraint of the
resource is met or the marginal values of all the
alternative uses are equal. Operationally, this principle
produces maximum profit in the case of the firm,
maximum utility in the case of a consumer, and
maximum economic welfare in the case of society.
Value is determined by the willingness to pay for the
product or service. So water in a market environment
will be allocated to its highest value use first (e.g.
drinking water), then other potable uses in the
household (e.g. cooking), then . . . and eventually to the
production of low-value, non-food agricultural crops.
In practice this optimal allocation process is constrained
by laws, regulations and property rights that discourage
a market for water.

Lesson #7: Law Trumps Economics, But Only
Temporarily
Figure 2 illustrates a theory of economic development
popularized by Nobel Prize-winning neo-institutional
economist Douglas North (1990). Countries face
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well as the active participation of all impacted parties.
Water management policy, given its vital role in the
sustainability of life, demands the best science
available.
During my twenty years of working
professionally in agricultural water policy, I have
observed that good science is often an afterthought in
the public policy process. Public policy makers require
the best, science-based information available, but useful
science will only be available if there are well-traveled
information bridges between public agencies, the
private sector, and the scientists (Figure 3). Currently,
these three bridges receive highly variable traffic while
at other times they fall into disuse. In some states, these
bridges may have even fallen into disrepair and
represent a hazard for the traveler.

resource, technological, and market constraints over
which they have limited control. With a science-based
knowledge of these constraints, an institutional
framework should be designed, according to North
(1990), to create optimal opportunity sets for profit and
non-profit organizations in the country. The key to
economic development is developing appropriate rules
for managing scarcity. Organizations can change their
opportunity sets by modifying the constraint set (e.g.
technological change) and/or creating different
institutions (e.g. lobbying Congress for new rules).
When politics dominate the economics of water
resource management, institutions are changed,
frequently to modify the opportunity sets available to
special interests—municipalities (industry including
agriculture), Native Americans, environmentalists, and
recreationists. Why? The economic framework for
socially optimal water allocation is not in place.
Conflicts arise between these interests, creating an
ongoing battleground for lawyers specializing in water
law. New law will change economic incentives (e.g.
opportunity sets) for some, but not others. This
“improvement” is only temporary because technological
change, urbanization, population growth, global
markets, etc. change the constraint set.
Any
“improvement” also may be temporary when parties not
served by the new law seek to change it.

Effective and efficient informational bridges cost money
to construct and maintain.
Optimal two-way
information flows take time and effort to manage.
There must be incentives to use them as well. For
academics, the disincentives to travel these bridges are
daunting. Policy decisions often have technical analysis
deadlines that teaching faculty find impossible to meet.
All academic incentives give priority to disciplinary
research rather than interdisciplinary research and
outreach education. Water policy decisions require a
system-wide analysis where all sciences, combined with
law and politics, produce a sustainable strategy. But
this is a messy, time consuming process. Most
academic scientists are not trained to think holistically,
understand competing interests, or have the patience to
work in multi-disciplinary teams. The National Science
Foundation’s sponsored science and technology centers
are one model for building these needed bridges and
maintaining two-way traffic between scientists and
decision-makers.

Lesson #8: You Have the Deep Pockets
During the early 1980s it became even clearer to some
analysts that agriculture would not be able to afford
CAP water (Martin et al., 1982; Martin, 1988). The
rational strategy of growers in CAP irrigation districts,
according to these social scientists, was to play the
water development game for as long as possible. Once
it became clear that they could not afford this water,
society, via government agencies, would adjust the rules
and prices in favor of the farmers who were still in
business. Growers were well aware that there was legal
precedent to support this strategy (Smith, 1986).

A CONCLUDING REMARK
A fundamental challenge in water resource management
is getting the economics right—right for this generation
as well as future generations. Understanding the
physical and biological science behind water scarcity is
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for effective
water policy. Appropriate emphasis as well should be
placed on the social science of water management
decision-making at all levels of society. Social science
information, to be useful, must travel in a timely and
effective manner in two directions on established
information bridges between interested parties. A recent
revelation associated with the CAP is that social science
concerns associated with water management, more than
hydrology and engineering, now drive the sustainability
of the project. As Kelso, Martin and Mack (1973: 244)
prophetically noted nearly thirty years ago, “Water
scarcity, even growing scarcity, is far less costly to the

Who pays when we do not get the economics right?
You and I do. The favorite fiscal strategy of publicly
funded projects like the CAP is to spread the costs
“lightly” across millions of households and concentrate
the benefits for a relatively select few beneficiaries.
Urban taxpayers and ratepayers have the proverbial
deep pockets.
BUILDING WELL-TRAVELED BRIDGES
BETWEEN ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND WATER
POLICY
Effective and efficient decision systems for resource
management require timely and useful information as
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Figure 3: Bridging For Improved Water Resource Management
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Professor Wilson earned his Ph.D. in agricultural and
applied economics at the University of Minnesota.

Arizona economy than is popularly supposed; whatever
costliness the scarcity does impose, amelioration is far
more a matter of reforming man-made institutional
inefficiencies in water administration and management
than in reforming its nature-made physical scarcities.”
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